ABSTRACT-
The study examines the effect of the degree of family politicization on several. citizenshipo . * orientations of adolescents. The research population,consisted of 734 respondents ages 14-18, who were students in both academic and vocational schools in the greater TelAviv area.Degree of family politicitation was assessed using three subscai 9:parents°o wn invoMment; the extent to which parents and children discuss politics, and the degree to which parents encourage their children to take an active public role in school and in youth organizations. Citizenship orientations included the perception of the citizen role as active Vs. passive, and as restricted to the political sphere Vs. as a broader commitment to one's community and society. Also incldded were political efficacy, support of frPpdom of spaPch, and political involvement.A path model measuring the effects of social and personal background variables and of family politicization was tested. The major findings indicate that respondents' age and S.E.S. were related to their perceived degree of family politicization. The older the respondents and the lower their S.E.S., the greater the tendency ,to report of lower family politicization.Concerning the effects of family politicization upon. Lhe perception of the citizen role, none of the path coefficients was statistically significant, and the pPrcantaga of-aXplainPd variagce was low. Concerning the other citizenship crientations,.family politicization had significant effects.The higher the degree ,of family politicization, .the greater the political efficacy and involvement of the respondents, and the lower their support of freedom of speech.
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;'s
Studies of the family as an agent of political socialization indicate that overall its impact upon the formation of children's citizenship orientations is quite limited. If that influece is measured by intergenerational continuity,, the correlations between parents' and children's orientations are overall positive but weak.
Measured by rebellion, tie political sphere rarely serves a as target of intergenerational rebellion (Ichilov, 1984) . This conclusion is surprising given the duration and intensity of children°s exposure to familial influences. One possible explanation that has been offered is that familial characteristics relevant to the political . socialization process were not yet properly identified and measured (Connell, 1972; Ichilov, 1984) ,
This study attempts to contribute to our understanding of political socialization in two principalways. First, in contrast to studies which focused uPon family characteristics such as S.E.S or the socialization techniques employed by the parents, which can be related to a widde range of outcomma, the prPsPnt study focuses upon the degree of family. politicization which, presumably is more directly related to the formation of citizens'dp orienLaLirs. Secondly, some students examined primarily intPrfamilial characteristics and processes such as the authority structure of the family or the emotional relations between parents and childien (Keniston, 1967; Bloch et.al., 1969; Chaffee 1973) ,Others have focused mainly upon characteristics related to the position of the family within the socio-cultural structure, such as S.E.S and ethnic origin ,or upon social 4' forces external to the family which shape disLinct.'generaLional characLeristics (Mannheim,1952; Converse & bupeux, 1962; Converse, 1964) ,In the present study the two sets of familial -characteristics are integrated in a model in an attempt to examine their direct and indirect relationships to selected citizenship orientations of Israeli youth.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Sociocultural familial characteristics and adolescents' citizenship orientations.
In. western democracies a relationship was found between individuals' citizenship orientations'
and their socio-economic background, indicating that political sub-!cultures at least partly overlap
With status sub-cultures.Socio-economic status affectso for example, voting patterns (Himmelweit et.al., 1981) . Also, people belonging to higher socio-economic groups more frequently possess a stronger sense of political efficacy, are better informed, and are more actively involved in public affair's than those belonging to the /lower echelons of society. Liberal orientations were alsc more parvelant among members of higher S.E.S groups (Lane, 1959; Stouffer, 1955; Upset, 1960; Easton, 1965; Milbrath, 1965) .Many of these class differebces among adults have been replicated among adolescents (Easton & Dennis, 1967; Langton, 1969; ,Jaros,q97) .
Ethnicity and race often overlap with S.E.S. In Israel there are two ethnic blocks which differ from each, other in socio-economic status and cultural traditions: the Jews of westwrn Europe-America ) who form the dominant group; and the Jews of eastern origin (i.e, Middle Eastern, Asian, and North.African origin), who although now comprise over 50% of Isrears entire populatibn, do not proportionally share in the national income, educational. attainment, centr &l political positions dnd prestigeous occupations.Theselldifferences are also reflected in the political qrientations and behaviors of memberi of the two blocks.EasLerners tend to vote for the religious and right-wing parties, While westerners,especially those of higher S.E.S, more frequently opt for the left (Antonovsky, 1963 a,b; Arian, 1973; Zlozower,1972) .Also, adults of eastern origin were Pound to be less well informed about public affairs, expressed lower sense of political efficacy, participated less in phlitics and tended.to have a lesser regard for the democratic civic culture, (Fain, 1967; Nachmias, 1973; ELzipni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977) . However, inspite of the great intarganerational continuity within Israeli society, Ichilov and Nave (1981) report that the civic qt-ientati,ms ejf eastern youth resembled those of their western counterparts.Both groups perceived 5 6 good citizenship primarily as a commitment to political institutions and processes, rather than as a broadPr-coMmitment to the community and society. They also stressed passive orientations more than active participatory ones.
How do the sociocultural characteristics of the family affect the formation of children's citizPnship orientations in terms of both, intergenerational continuity and discontinuity? Our . argumPnt is that these familial traits can be decomposed into two major sets of variables with reference to the role of the family as an agent of political socialization. First, families have a controlling function which manifests itself in many ways.Families direct children toward "class appropriatP" extrafamilial frameworks such as schools, and youth organizations; and t1e parents might control the choice of friLds by their children , (Langton, 1967; , Sebert et.al. 1974,; Ichilov, p 1984) . In Isra61, for example, participation-in youth movements characterizes the middle classes, ankl the youngsters tend to join the same movements in which their parents had participated as adolescents (Eaton & Chen, 1970; Ichilov, 1977) : -Parents also serve as "gate keepers," controlling mass media use. The parents determine what newspapers, magazines and books are available at home, and the types and.number of T.V. prOgrams that children watch (roily, 1,973; Atkin & Cantz, 1978;  .44 Chaffee & Beckhr, 1975; Roberts et.al., 1975; Renshon, 1977) .The use of the various types of mass media to follow public affairs, rather than for entertainment purposes is more characteristic of the higher than of the lower S.E.S groups in society.
A second category includes interfamilial characteristics and processes which are related to actual interactions within the family. Here attention has focused upon nonpolitical human relations in gPnPral which, presumably, could serve as an important source for the understanding of political rPlations.Such interactions enable individuals to acquira competence in participatory. behavior and in docision making processes, for example, which can later on be equally applied in political and in nonpolitical contexts. Almond and Verbs (1963) report that participation, vaguely defined as subjects° memory of "consistently being able to express themselves in family decisions" ski 6 6 (pp. 2878), was related to the acceptance of democratic attitudes and to civic comkl.tence .others report that political activists greW up in families which allowed great freedom of experimentation, stressing the search for meaningful life more than materialism (Flacks, 1967) . The tendency to 0 politically rebel against the parents was associated with emotional distance between the child and 0 parents, and was also more common when the parents were either to permissive or too stern (Middleton &utney, 1963 a,b ).
An important interfamilial trait which has been greatly neglected in political socialization 4 studies is the degree of family politicization. Where it was considered, uference was made only to the parents' own involvement in politics-and in public affairs. This implies4perhaps, that family politicization is assumed to exert influence upon children primarily through the example or the "role model" which the parents provide. Our extended definition of family politicization assumes that the parents can be influential in more ways. In the present study, in addition to parents' own involvemen.., family politicization included two more sub scales. First, the extent to which parents and cLildran discuss politics. Secondly,the degree to which parents encourage their children to Lake on an active public.role in school and in youth organizations (For example: leaders in youth, movements or members of the school aouncil).These various aspects were ,examined subjectively, as.
reported by the youngsters Lhemselves.We do not ask whetter a youngsf.er who grew up in highly politicized family is more likely to sLrongly,supporL certain citizenship orientations; we ask the more modest question of whether youngsters who report that their parents dreactive, encouraging and responsive, also report of stronger support of such orientations. A similar approach has been adopted in other studies, notably by Almond & Verba,(1965) .
Children who grow up within the same family might be differentially exposed to its influances.Concerning political socialization, children's age and sex seems to be of special relevance., Politics is sometimes considered as an area Loo remote and complex to be of interest to, young children. Also, politics entails conflicts, while some parents Lend to be protective and to expose their young children mainly to Lhe harmonious aspects of social life.Consequently, politics is considered a subject which parents rarely discuss with young children (Converse, 1964; .Tolly, 1973 with their younger ones. these discussions may be initiated by the parents or by the youngsters themselves. Older children may ,thus, be more intensively exposed to familial influencesothan younger ones.
Politics is still considered a male°s domain, and parents often encourage their sons more Lhan their daughters to take interest in politics and in public affairs (Hyman, 1959; Greenstein, 1965; Easton & Dennis, 1969; 'Dowse & Hughes, 1971) .This situation has somewhat changed in recent years as a result of`a more egalitarian division of labor between men and women in the family and society.Consequently sex differentiated socializatich might be diminishingjeading Lo greater a similarity in parents': expectations of their children regardless of the child's sex.Also more "role models" are available: today for girls of women who are actively involved in politics and in OutiliC affairs.Studies have shown that female "role models" are extremly important in shaping girls aspirations and orientations in the various social spheres (Aloquist & Angrist, 1971; Baruch, 1972) .
,The Hypothesized Causal Model
We, assumed that the sociocultural familial traits (i.e.: S.E.S, ethnic origin) and the respondents' personal traits age, sex) would be more strongly related to citizenship orientations via family politicization Lhan directly. In order to ket. a more rounded picture of the impact of Lhe various sQurces of influence upon youngsters° citizenshi orientations, we consLrutLed a model placing these variables in a logically coherent sequence. Thi odel has been empirically examined using the statistical method of path analysip.This meLhor an be used to determine whether variables which are causally prior on logical grounds, act directly indirectly ndirectly Lhrough the
influence of other variables (Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973) . In our case Are therespondents° S.E.S, 1r, ethnic origin, age and sex directly related to citizenship orientations, or is their impact mediated through family politicization. The hypothesized model is presented in Figure 1 .
Insert Figure 1 aabout here
It is assumed that four extrinsic variables affect citizenship orientations.These variables might have a direct effect upon citizenship orientations.Their influence, however, could also be mediated through family politicization.In this case, while S.E:S and ethnic origin are assumed to affect the degree of reported parents' politicization, adolescents'' sax and age are assumej to affect the degree of exposure to political interactions within the Family. In other words, families of lower S.E.S and of eastern origin are expected to be less politicized Lhan families representing higher socio-economic echelons and those of western origin. Also, boys as compared with girls, are expected to report of more frequent interactions with parents over political issues, and of greater parental encouragement to get involVed in public affairs. The same should be expected-of older children as compared with younger ones.
Citizenship orientations included the perception of the citizen role as active Vs. passive, and as restricted to the political sphere Vs. as a broader commitment to one°s community and society.
Also included were political efficacy, support of freedom of speech, and political involvement.
We expected the indirect impact.nf the four extrinsic variables, which operates through family Politicization, to be greater than thEjr direct impact upon citizenship orientations.Hore.
specifically, we expected adolescen..4 Qlo come from highly politicized families to project (with the effects of all other variables partialled out) more active and a broader image of the good citizen, to possess a stronger sense of political efficacy, add to eApress greaLlz involvement and stronger support of freedom of speech than youngsters-who come from less politicized families. nza (X2):-1=14, 2=15, 3=16, 4=17, 5=18.
S.E.S (X3): Socioeconomic status is an index based on, the sum of standardized scores of father's education and occupation. Father's education was,measured by number of,yearsof schooling and was coded 1 for higher-education and 8 fot partial elementary education-Father's occupation was coded by HarLman's Israeli occupational prestige scale (HartMan, 1979) and was devided into five /categories (1=high,'5=low). Overall S.E.S was than devided into three categories: 1=high, 3=low.
Ethnic Origin (X4): Was determined by fuLher's country of birth and coded: 1=westwrn, 2=Isragi
born, 3=eastern.
1. frameworks such as the family and place of work.
In our analysis these items were grouped into two major categories, political (X9) and nonpolitical (X12) item. The political category was further devided into active (X10) Vs. passive, 2.I °m interested in Israeli politics and ,public affairs.
3.1 think a great deal about what is happening in 'the countrx.
0"
4.1 regularly discuss politics and pub1i,c_affairs with,my friends. 6.If I were requested to sign a petition dealing with civil liberties, I would have signed it..
7.rm'prepared to demonstrate for something I believe in.
8.I°m prepa7ed to write a "letter Lo the editor" about injustice that I encountered.
9iI°m prepared to dedicate a social meeting kpodiscuss political issues.
10.rm willing to become active in an ideological movement, " P Political involvement was, coded 1=high,, 5=low., .
Findings
We had expected adolese1enLs' perception-of family poliLicibtion Lo be related to their age, sex, S.E.S and ethnic origin. However, Lhe data presented in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that only age and S,E,S had a significant effect upon family politicization. As expected,
Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here respondents of higher S.E.S reported of higher overall family, politicization, of greater parental iniflivement in politics, and of frequent discussion with parents of political issues. However, contrary Lo expectations, increase in age was inversly related to overall family poliLicizalion.Older adolescents, as compared with younger ones, described their parents as less involved and as less encouraging of them to get involved in public affairs.
We had also expected adolescents( citizenship orientations to be more strongly relted to family politicization than to their age, sex, S.E.S, and ethnic brigin.This expectation was supported by the data concerning political efficacy and political involvement only.Family
13
-13-politicization had the largest effect upon these orientations, and of special importance was the sub-scale of.parent/child interaction. Differences were found between boys and girls concerning these two orientations. Girls possessed a stronger sense of political efficacy, and reported of greater political involvement than boys.Political involvement also tended to increasl with the rise in the respondents' age. The largest percentage of explained variance by all antecedent variables was that of political involvement (21.3%). These variables accounted for 16.2% of the variance of political efficacy.
Concerning freedom of speech, age had the largest effect, indicating that support increases with the increase in the respondents° age.A16o, girls were less supportive of freedom of speech, han boys, and respondents of higher S.E.S were more supportive than respondents representing the lower S.E.S groups.Family politicization shows an interesting relationship to support of freedom Of speech. Contrary to our expectations, the more politicized the family, the weaker the st!pporL of, freedom.aepeech. The antecedent variables accounted for 19.2% of the variance of freedom of speech.
The Perception of the good citizen, contrary to expectations, was not related to any of the antecedent variables, and the percentage of explained variance of its various sub-scales was low.
The only exception is the effect of ethnic origin upon the active dimension of good citizenship, indicating that respondents of western origin assigned to it greater importance than respondents of eastern origin.
Conclusion
The purpose of the present study was to examine the effects of extrafamilial traits (i.s.:
S.E.S and ethnic origin), interfamilial characteristics (i.e: degree of family politicization and its sub-scales), and respondents' personal traits (i.e: sex and age) upon selecttd citizenship orienLations.We assumed that the extrafamilial and the personal traits can be directly related to 14 <,* -14 citizenship orientations, or indirectly via family politicization. While respondents' age.may signify growing sophistication and knowledge, iL was argued that age and sex can also signify differential exposure to familial interactions. Older children and boys were, thus, expected to be more intensively exposed to familial influences than both girls and 'younger children.-Respondents'
S.E.S and ethnic origin can be directly related to citizenship orientations by virtue of placing individuals-in-political-sub-cultures which, aL least partly overlap with class sub-cultures.They can also be indirectly related to citizenship orientation, through their-effect upon interfamilial interactions.
Overall, the degree of politicization of families in the present study was described by our 'adolescent respondents as medium (the scores ranged between 2.122 and 3.406). The data revealed that contrary to expectations, older respondents tended to describe their families as less politicized than their younger counterparts.They reported that their parents are less involved in politics, and less encouraging of them to Cake on active public rols in school and in the youth movements. This unexpected-finding can perhaps be attributed to the growing ability of adolescents to criticize reality 'by applying some ideological standards, and to their growing sophistication,, knowledge and independence (Adelson & 0°neil, 1966; Adelson, 1971; Connell, 1971; Merelman, 1971) . Older ., respondents° description of their families as less,politicized mmy, thus, reflect criticism of their parents and a less idealized image of adults in general.The respondents°p erception of diminishing parental encouragement can also be related to actual decrease in parental support for their children°s involvement in various-extra-curricular activities. Parents may be preoccupiedwith adolescents' success in the matriculation examinations, most of which take place in the 11th. and 12th. grades of the Israeli high school.Consequently, they may encourage their children to concentrate on their studies, and to give up, at least temporarily, other types of activity.
As expected, respondents of higher socioeconomic status reported that their parents are politically-involved and discuss politics with them, more often than respondents of lower S.E.S.
However, ngfdifferences in family politicization were found by ethnic origin. That ethnic origin 15 had nv significant affect upon family politicization is related,-perhaps, to the fact that the majority of Israel°s population, Whether of eastern or of western origin, came over from non democratic countries. As aresulL, S.E.S rather than ethnic origin may have -greater relevance, for family politicization. Contrary to expectations, no differences were found between boys and girls-concerning reported family Aliticization.
tAj
We had expected the indirect effect. of age, sex, S.E.S and ethnic origin, i.e., the one mediated through family politicization, to be greater than their direct effect upon adolescents°c itizenship orientations. This proved to be the case only concerning political efficacy and political involvement for which family politicization had the strongest effect.As expcLed high, family politicization was related to stronger sense of political efficacy and to greater political involvement. However, contrary to expectations it was inversely related to the support of freedom of speech: the more politicized the family, the lower the support of freedom of speech. In Israel politics is verOleavily ideologically infused. In other words, political struggles between groups are related to the very image of the state and its institutions, and not merely to the size of the slices allocated from the "national pie." The rifts between groups are related to such sensitive issues as separation of state and religion,treatment of minorities, and the future of the territories of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip (Isaac,1976) .Consequently, people who are politicized most probably are not neutral, but rather take a stand over these issues. In Israel this trend seems to be related to lack of tolerance for other people°s views, and to a lesser support of freedom of speech. Shamir and Sullivan (1982) have found that the overall levels of political tolerance in Israel, while not high, are similar to levels found in the U.S. in the 1980s.However, unlike the U.S., these levels of. tolerance were similarly characteristic of Israelis regardless of their S.E.S., ethnic origin, and religiosithe selection of the least-liked groups in Israel varied according to sociocultural background, characteristics, bul...not the levels of tolerance.
The data also reveals that S.E.S and ethnic origin were not significantly related to most of the orientations that were examined. The only two exceptions were concerning freedom of speech which was more strongly supported by respondents of higher S.E.S groups, and ative participation which was more pervelant among western respondents. Respondents° personal traits, i.e. age and sex, had greitPr relevance for citizenship orientations than the socio-culural characteristics of the family.
Increase in the respondents° age was related to an increase in their support of freedom of speech . and of political involvement. Girls prujecied greater political involvement and a stronger sense of viAR political efficacy than boys, but expressed lower support than boys for freedom of speech. Girls°w eaker support of freedom of speech can be related to their stronger, political involvement which, in Israel, is usually inversely related to tolerance for other people°s views.
The results of the present study may have some broader implication6 for the study of the process of political socialization and of the role of the family in it. Students of political socialization, implicitly or explicitly, make some assertions which, our data suggests, should be reconsidered. First, while the fact that.political orientations and behaviors are not derived from simply one source has been recognizedoLudents of political socialization often consider the ilnfluPnCe of a particular socialization agent to uniformally affect all types of citizenship orientations. Almond and.Verba (1963) , for example, maintain that partricipation in ddcisions in -non-political settings such as the family, school and place of work, reinforces individuals° overall civic compeLenpe and their suppot of democratic values.Secondly,civic competences such as "participation" and "involvement" were considered to be free of content.Once mastered, these compPtPnces can be generalized and applied in a variety of contexts to a wide range of contents.
Our data indicate that familial characteristics differentially affect the orientations that were PxaminPd in terms of both strength and direction of the relationships. While interaction with parents was the most important family trait, strengthening political efficacy and involvemPht,parents° own involvement has weekened respondents° support for freedom of speech.The pPrception of the "good citizen" was not'related to family politicization and to the ot er antecedent variables.These differences can be related to the content and nature of the orientations thPmsPlves.For example, orientations may vary in their complexity,concretness, the frequency of 
